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Abstract
Optimal pollution tax rate is derived for labor-managed and profit-
maximizing Cournot oligopolies with polluting firms and without product
differentiation. If all firms are identical, the optimal pollution tax rate is
higher than the marginal value of the environmental damage for labor-
managed cournot oligopoly and lower than the marginal value of the envi-
ronmental damage for profit-maximizing Cournot oligopoly.
1. Introduction
A labor-managed firm is defined to be a firm which maximizes its
surplus per unit labor. Labor-managed firms were prevalent in the former
Yugoslavia, and many Japanese firms are considered to be labor-managed
(see Komiya (1988)). The labor-managed firm under perfect competition
has been known to behave perversely if the price of the product it is pro-
ducing changes (see Ward (1958)), that is, its output decreases in the
event of an increase in the product price. Labor-managed Cournot oligop-
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oly has been first formulated by Hill and Waterson (1983), and its behav-
ior has been analyzed in relation to profit-maximizing Cournot oligopoly
by them, Neary (1984) and Okuguchi (1993), among others. In all of
these works, firms have been implicitly assumed to produce products
without emitting harmful effluents generally known as pollution which
damages the environment. One of governmental policies to mitigate the
environmental damage is to levy pollution tax on firms' effluents. The
optimal pollution tax rate which maximizes the total social welfare has
been investigated for perfectly competitive profit-maximizing firms (see
Barnett (1980), and Baumol and Oates (1980)). Ebert (1992), Okuguchi
and Yamazaki (1994) have derived the optimal pollution tax rate within
profit-maximizing Cournot oligopoly, assuming that firms' harmful efflu-
ents are proportional to their outputs. Simpson (1995) has conducted a
similar analysis for profit-maximizing Cournot duopoly using Shephard's
duality lemma on the relationship between a firm's cost function and
its factor demand. Okuguchi (2003) has extended Simpson's analysis to
profit-maximizing Cournot oligopoly where the firm's emission is not
necessarily proportional to its output.
To the best of my knowledge, no one has analyzed the effects of pol-
lution tax and the optimal pollution taxation for labor-managed firms and
labor-managed Cournot oligopoly. In this paper I will analyze the optimal
pollution tax rate within labor-managed Cournot oligopoly and within
profit-maximizing Cournot oligopoly. In Section 2, I will formulate labor-
managed Cournot oligopoly without product differentiation and with pol-
luting firms, and prove that given the pollution tax rate, there exists a
unique Cournot equilibrium. On the basis of this existence result, I will
then derive the optimal pollution tax rate that maximizes the net total so-
― 10 ―
Optimal Pollution Tax within Labor-Managedand Profit-Maximizing Cournot Oligopolies
cial welfare. In Section 3, I will prove the existence of a unique Cournot
equilibrium for a given pollution tax rate for profit-maximizing Cournot
oligopoly without product differentiation and derive the optimal pollution
tax rate maximizing the total social welfare, without using Shephard's
duality lemma as in Okuguchi (2003). As I have already mentioned, a
labor-managed firm, of which objective is maximization of the surplus per
unit of labor, behaves differently from a profit-maximizing one in the
event of a change in the product prtce. In this paper I will show that the
optimal pollution tax rate for labor-managed Cournot oligopoly and that
for profit-maximizing Cournot oligopoly have asymmetric properties in re-
lation to the marginal value of the environmental damage. I will simplify
my analysis in Sections 2 and 3 by reducing the existence problem for the
Cournot equilibrium to a fixed-point problem for a function involving
only one variable, that is, industry output. Section 4 concludes.
2. Labor-managed Cournot Oligopoly
Let there be n firms aiming to maximize the surplus per unit labor.
The firms are assumed to form expectations on all its rivals' outputs a la
Cournot. I use the following notation.
/, : firm z's labor
Xj : firm f s output
/, = h/ix,), firm /'s inverse production functions, i. e. factor de-
mand
e, = gi(x, ), firm /'s emission rate of harmful effluent
s, : firm z's surplus per unit labor
kj : firm f s fixed cost
p :product price
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p =f(Xxi), inverse demand function
w : competitive wage rate
t :pollution tax rate per unit effluent
X = loCj , industry output
L = £/,-, industry factor demand
E = £<?;, total emission
D = D(E), value of the environmental damage
By definition, the surplus per unit labor for firm i is
xt f&Xj) - wht & )-tgj (Xj )-ki
Si = rr~^ (1)
The functions /, h-t and g, are assumed to have the following general
properties.
Assumption 1 : /' < 0, h,' > 0, h," ^ 0, g! > 0, g!f > 0,
i =1,2, ･･･,≪. (2)
Inequality h" ^ 0 implies labor's non-increasing marginal product. If all
firms behave under Cournot expectations on their rivals' outputs and if, in
addition, the maximum is interior, firm /'s first order condition for profit
maximization is given by
ds' A
_ Q
dX; h?(Xi) '
where A = {f&X;) + x, f'(Lxj) - wh',(xi) - tgfc)}h, (x,)
- {x, f&c,) - wh, (x,) - tgi tot) - k, }h,%)
/ = l,2,---,≪. (3)
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Let the numerator in (3) be v,. Then the second order condition is simpli-
fied in light of v, = 0 as
^
=
^<°<
i=1'2-'*' (4)
dx, h,(Xi)
where
^L=(2f+xir-WhlH-tgfjhi
-kh＼
dx, ^ J
-
(xj
- wh, -th, - k-,
)/*/',
i = 1,2, ･ ･ ･ ,n. (5)
I now introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 2 : f + xt f" < 0, i = 1,2, ■■･, n.
This assumption has been widely used in the literature on profit-max-
imizing Cournot oligopoly. It is satisfied if the inverse demand function is
linear, and if it is concave. It holds also if the degree of its convexity is
not too large. If a labor-managed firm is to be viable, surplus per unit
labor has to be nonnegative, /. e. st > 0. The second order condition
―'- < 0 holds under Assumption 2 in view of h" ^ 0, g" ^ 0 and S; ^ 0.
dx,
Using the definition X = Zx, , I rewrite the first order condition (3) as
v, (*,,X,f) = {f(X)+xif'(X)-wi hKx^-tg'iixMbi)
- {x, f(X)-whl(x,)-tg,- (*,-) - h, }h!{Xi)
= 0, / = 1,2, ･･･,/!, (6)
which is an implicit function among x-nX and t. Simple calculations yield
― 13 ―
Optimal Pollution Tax within Labor-Managed and Profit-Maximizing Cournot Oligopolies
^
= (h, + x, hfif - (wh!1 + tg") - (*,./ - Wh,
-tg, -k,)h" <0 / = 1,2,..-,w. (7.1)
^
= xlfhi + JC|./^―*/^0, i = 1,2,...,≫. (7.2)
it t
- 0 according as a.{ = ――'- > ―'- = /5;,
< ^ g,
i = 1,2, ･■･,/!, (7.3)
where a, and /?,･ are elasticities of /z,and g, with respect to X; , respec-
tively. Note that h" ^ 0 implies that ―― h' ^ 0. Hence, in view of this
dv
X'
and /' < 0, I have ―- > 0 if /" ^ 0 (convex or linear inverse demand
oX
function). Otherwise, the sign of ―- is indeterminate.
Now solve (6) with respect to x, to get
x, =<p'(X,t), i = l,2,--.,n. (8)
where
d^ dX
dx,
dp' dt
^T = ^' '' = 1.2.-.≪- (9-2)
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The signs of the above partial derivatives are indeterminate in light of
(7.2) and (7.3). Given an arbitrary value of t, the Cournot equilibrium in-
dustry output is identifiable as a fixed-point of one variable function
<p(X,t), i.e. the solution of one variable equation,
X=l^'(X,t) =f(X,t), (10)
where the partial derivatives of <£ are in general indeterminate. I introri"^
the following assumption.
Assumption 3 : (p' (0, t) > 0, i = 1,2, ■■･, n.
d<p
It is clear that under this assumption (10) has a unique solution if ― < 0.
dip d<p
It has also a unique solution if 0 <. ― < 1. Inequality ― < 0 is true if
4 ~ dX dX
f is sufficiently concave to ensure ―- < 0 for all i. If/ is convex, I get
dv- d<p
―'- > 0 and ― ^0. Hence, in this case (10) has a unique solution if
dx dx
dip
― < 1. Let the unique solution of (10) be
dX H
X=X{t＼ (11)
where
dip
dX
_
~dt
dT~77^f
(12)
dX
dip dip
If ― < 0 or ― < 1, the denominator of the above expression is positive.
dX dX f f
dip dip
■
However, the sign of ― < 0 is indeterminate. If a, > p, for all /,
n
&P dty
> 0, consequently ― > 0. On the other hand, ― < 0 if a, < J3, for all /.
dt dt
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d(f dtp
The case where ― < 0 and ― > 0 hold simultaneously is shown in the
dX dt
figure.
A
■― -...._ , <p(X,t2)
/
<p(X,tx) "'･-.//
/ ＼ j＼ tincreases ＼
^£_ I I ＼ ＼
,
0 X(u) X(u) X
Figure: Equilibrium industry output as an increasing function of t, where tj < t2 .
I am now in a position to determine the optimal pollution tax rate for
labor-managed Cournot oligopoly. The total social welfare W, which is to
be maximized with respect to the pollution tax rate, is defined as the sum
of the firms' profits, the consumers' surplus and the governmental revenue
from pollution tax minus the value of the environmental damaged caused
by firms' effluents. Thus
fx
W = Ztt. + / /(7V7 - Xf(X) + tE -D(E)
Jo
=
I
f(l)di - wXhj (Xj) - Ikj - D
fa
(Xj)), (13)
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where X and x} s in the above expression are evaluated at the equilibrium
and are functions of t. Differentiating W with respect to t,I get
dW dx dxj
tdxj= f(x) wish, ―-― D Ze,. ――
dt J dt J dt Sj dt
-(.-D'J^ + I^V-^/)^-. (14)
where I have made use of the first order condition (3) as well as the defi-
dW
nition of st . The optimal pollution tax rate must satisfy = 0. Hence
dt
l^hj-Xjf) (15)
t =D'+ .
Note that the sign of the expression s, h- ― Xjf is positive for all j. How-
dx
ever, I can not say anything definite regarding the sign of ――, conse-
dt
quently, that of the second term on the right hand side of (15). Hence, I
get t―D'in general.
In order to get a clearer result, I consider a symmetric case in which
all firms are assumed to be identical, i, e.
/,. =hi (Xi) = h(Xi)
e> =8i(Xi) = g(Xi)
for all i. In this case, xt = x for all i and
dX dx> > .
― = n ―- according as a, =a-p = (3i for all i.
dt dt
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Hence, regardless whether a > j3 or ex.< ft, the second term in (15) is un-
ambiguously positive, leading to
t>D'. (16)
To wit, if all firms are identical, the optimal pollution tax rate is set
at a level higher than the marginal value of the environmental damage. As
a corollary of this result, I can assert that the optimal pollution tax rate for
labor-managed monopoly is higher than the marginal value of the environ-
mental damage.
3. Profit-Maximizing Cournot Oligopoly
In this section I will derive the optimal pollution tax rate for profit-
maximizing Cournot oligopoly, without using Shephard's duality lemma
as in Okuguchi (2003). I will stick to the notaton in Section 2. However, I
will use the production function,
*,-=//('/). f!>0, fi<0, i = 1,2, ...,,, (17)
instead of the factor demand function /, = h, (x{). Moreover, I will de-
note the inverse demand function as p = p(X) instead of p =f(X) as in
Section 2 to avoid possible confusion of/ with the producton function.
Therefore, firm i's profit ?r, is given as
7T, =P(X)xi-wli -tgi(ft(lt))
= pCZfj(lj))fi(l,)-wli -tg, (/,≪,)),
i = l,2,---,n. (18)
where I have assumed away fixed cost. The first and second order condi-
tions for profit maximization for firm i's profit under the Cournot behav-
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ioristic assumption yield (19) and (20), respectively.
^L
= p'(Xfj(ij))fi(ii)f!(ii)+P(Xfj(ij))fi'(ii)
-yv-tg'i(fi(i,))f!(h) =o, i = i,2,.･･,/!. (19)
3 TV-
―r = (p +fi Pj)fi + (p +fi P )fi +p ft
-tig-f+glf") <0, i = 1,2,-･■,/!, (20)
where in (19), I have assumed away corner maximum. As it stands, it is
not clear if (20) holds. I therefore introduce the following assumption to
resolve this indeterminacy.
Assumption 4 : p + x{ p1 > 0, p' + x, p" < 0, g'/f!2 + g!f!' > 0,
i = l,2,.--,n. (21)
The first inequality implies that firm /'s marginal revenue with respect to
increase in its output is positive. The second one asserts that the marginal
revenue is decreasing with respect to increase in its output. The third one
holds f" ― 0. I rewrite the first order condition (19) as
Ht (h ,X,t) =p'(X)f(li)fi(li) +p(X)fi'(li) -w
-tg'i(fi(li))f!(li)=O, i =l,2,---,n. (22)
Solving (22) with respect to //,I get
/, =^ (X,t), i = 1,2,--.,≪, (23)
where
X dX P' (/!'£ +f!2) +Pf>' - t(g;>f!2 + g!f) '
i = 1,2, ･･･,≪. (24.1)
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&d>' z'-'f^+g'f"
ft P' (ff, +/;2) +Pf," - t(g;'f;2 + g;f)
i = 1,2, ･ ･･,/!. (24.2)
The Cournot equilibrium industry output is indentical to the fixed point of
a single variable function ip(x,t), /. e. it is the solution of
X =2fj(il>'(X,t)) =^(X,t), (25)
where
^X=
^
= X0X<O. (26.1)
V, =^ = If;^t <0. (26.2)
Introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 5: tf {0, rj > 0, y = 1,2, ･ ･ ･, n.
As ^ is strictly decreasing in x and ty{ 0,t) > 0 under this assumption,
given t, (25) has a unique solution, which is strictly decreasing in t in
light of (26.2) and
f
= -^<0. (27)
ax 1 ― ipx
On the other hand, the individual firm's output response to a change in t
is ambiguous as
^L-f^L.
(78)
dt ~fi dt' ( }
it^x
f
+ ^O- (29)
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The total social welfare is defined by
W = 5k, +J*p(T)dr-p(X)X
+ agj(fj(lj)) -D(I.gj(fj(lj))
= J?p(T)dT-wL-D(I.gi(fj(lj)). (30)
Noting that W is a function of t in the equilibrium and differentiating
it with respect to /, I have
dW dX dL ,dl,
= z{P(x)f;-w-D'zg;f:}^r
where I have taken into account the first order condition (19) to derive the
last equality in (31). Hence, the optimal tax rate which maximizes W is
p fj Xj ~dT
t=D'+ -^-. (32)
The sign of the second term on the right hand side of (32) is in determi-
nate in general due to the indeterminacy of the sign of ―*―. Hence, the
dt
optimal pollution tax rate may be higher, lower than or equal to the mar-
ginal value of the environmental damage. If all firms are symmetric, i.e.
f-,=f and gj = g for all i, I have /, =/, x{ =x. Hence,
dx XdX
n
dt n dt
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therefore,
dx
dl
_~It
dt f
which leads to
t<D'. (33)
This inequality is entirely opposite to (16) for labor-managed Cournot oli-
gopoly. Note that (33) is true also for profit-maximizing monopoly. Note
further that (32) shows that if the product market is perfectly competitive,
the optimal pollution tax rate is equal to the marginal value of the envi-
ronmental damage.
4. Conclusion
There has been no research on the pollution taxation on labor-
managed competitive firm as well as on labor-managed Cournot oligopoly.
In Section 2, I have formulated labor-managed Cournot oligopoly without
product differentiation and with polluting firms which are subject to the
pollution taxation, and derived the optimal pollution tax rate which maxi-
mizes the total social welfare. In general case with asymmetric firms, the
optimal pollution tax rate may be higher, lower than or equal to the mar-
ginal value of the environmental damage. If all firms are symmetric in
the sense that their labor demand functions and emission functions are
identical, the optimal pollution tax rate is higher than the marginal value
of the environmental damage. In section 3, I have derived the optimal pol-
lution tax rate for profit-maximizing Cournot oligopoly without product
differentiation and with polluting firms. If firms are asymmetric, the opti-
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mal pollution tax rate may be higher, lower than or equal to the marginal
value of the environmental damage, as in the case of asymmetric labor-
managed Cournot oligopoly. However, if all firms are identical, the
optimal pollution tax rate is lower than the marginal value of the environ-
mental damage. The asymmetric properties of the optimal pollution tax
rate for labor-managed and profit-maximizing Cournot oligopolies may
be comparable to the asymmetric responses to product price change of
competitive labor-managed and profit-maximizing firms.
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